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We study the effect of variation in interest rates on investment spending, employing a large panel data
set that links yields on outstanding corporate bonds to the issuer income and balance sheet statements.
The bond price data -- based on trades in the secondary market -- enable us to construct a firm-specific
measure of the user cost of capital based on the marginal cost of external finance as determined in
the market for long-term corporate debt. Our results imply a robust and quantitatively important effect
of the user cost of capital on the firm-level investment decisions. According to our estimates, a 1 percentage
point increase in the user cost of capital implies a reduction in the investment rate of 50 to 75 basis
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The notion that business spending on ﬁxed capital falls when interest rates rise is a the-
oretically unambiguous relationship that lies at the heart of the monetary transmission
mechanism. Nevertheless, the presence of a robust negative relationship between invest-
ment expenditures and real interest rates—or the user cost of capital more generally—has
been surprisingly diﬃcult to document in actual data (e.g., Abel and Blanchard [1986] and
Schaller [2006]). Similarly, the magnitude of the response of investment to changes in cor-
porate tax policies is a key parameter that ﬁscal policy makers rely on when weighing the
costs and beneﬁts of altering the tax code. With the exception of Cummins, Hassett, and
Hubbard [1994], whose methodology utilizes ﬁrm-level variation in investment expenditures
within a context of a “natural” experiment, researchers have had a diﬃcult time identify-
ing the relationship between capital formation and changes in corporate tax policy (e.g.,
Schaller [2006] and Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer [1999, 2004]).1
The empirical diﬃculties associated with estimating the eﬀects of changes in interest
rates and corporate tax policies on business ﬁxed investment are often blamed on a lack of
identiﬁcation. At the macroeconomic level in particular, long-term interest rates (through
monetary policy actions) and corporate tax obligations (through investment tax credits or
partial expensing allowances) are often lowered when investment spending is weak.2 In
the extreme, the endogeneity between both monetary and ﬁscal policy actions and the
macroeconomy may result in a positive relationship between investment expenditures and
the user cost of capital.
In this paper, we revisit this apparent and long-standing empirical anomaly. We do
so by constructing a new data set that links income and balance sheet information for
about 900 large U.S. nonﬁnancial corporations to interest rates on their publicly-traded
debt. Covering the last three decades, this new data set enables us to evaluate and to
quantify empirically the relationship between ﬁrms’ investment decisions and ﬂuctuations
in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc user cost of capital based on marginal ﬁnancing costs as measured by the
changes in secondary market prices of ﬁrms’ outstanding bonds. Our results indicate that
investment spending is highly sensitive—both economically and statistically—to movements
in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of the user cost of capital. The sensitivity of capital formation
to changes in the user cost is robust to the inclusion of various measures of investment
1For extensive surveys of this topic, see Auerbach [1983] and Chirinko [1993]; see also Hassett and
Hubbard [1997] and Devereux, Keen, and Schiantarelli [1994].
2Partial expensing allowances permit ﬁrms to deduct a portion of their newly purchased capital goods
from their taxable income. In that sense, both an investment tax credit (ITC) and an expensing allowance
raise the ﬁrm’s after-tax income when the ﬁrm purchases capital goods. The two tax policies, however, diﬀer
in that under partial expensing, the ﬁrm is not allowed to claim any future depreciation allowances for its
expensed capital, whereas under an ITC, such a restriction is partly or wholly absent.
1opportunities emphasized by frictionless neoclassical models and to an estimation approach
that controls for the potential endogeneity between investment and ﬁnancial policy at the
ﬁrm level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief
overview of the user-cost framework and review the evidence—at both the macro and micro
levels—on the link between ﬁnancing costs and investment spending. Section 3 describes our
new data set and highlights its key feature. Section 4 outlines our panel-data econometric
methodology, and Section 5 presents our benchmark results. In Section 6, we consider an
alternative estimation approach that addresses the potential endogeneity between interest
rates and investment decisions at the ﬁrm level. This approach involves constructing an
instrument for the user cost of capital that explicitly controls for ﬁrm-speciﬁc expected
default risk using both option-theoretic measures of default probabilities and external credit
ratings of ﬁrms’ debt. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Framework
In this section, we brieﬂy outline the user-cost framework that motivates our empirical
analysis. We assume that output of the ﬁrm in period t—denoted by Yt—is a CES function
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Assuming a simple partial adjustment between actual and desired capital implies the fol-
lowing log-speciﬁcation for the growth rate of the capital stock:

















where the parameter 0 < λ < 1 measures the speed of adjustment to the desired stock
of capital and 1/(1 − σ) is the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost.
The partial adjustment model is typically implemented empirically with a variant of the
3We adopt the convention that the time subscript t on stock variables indicates the beginning of the
period—that is, Kt denotes the stock of capital at the beginning of period t.
2following regression
∆lnKt = η + ηy ln(Yt/Kt) + ηc lnC
K
t + ǫt, (1)







identiﬁes the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost. With Cobb-Douglas
production, σ = 0, and the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost is
unity. If −
ηc
ηy < 1, then σ < 0, implying that capital and labor are less substitutable
than in the Cobb-Douglas case. By contrast, if −
ηc
ηy > 1, then σ > 0, implying greater
substitutability of capital and labor compared with the Cobb-Douglas production function.
In the neoclassical user-cost framework, pioneered by the seminal work of Hall and
Jorgenson [1967], the incentive to purchase physical capital depends not only on the ﬁnancial
costs, but also on the price of investment goods relative to the price of output, the rate at
which capital depreciates, any expected gains or losses associated with capital purchases,
and the tax treatment of both capital purchases and the capital income. Formally, the user



















   




where Et denotes the conditional expectation operator based on the information available
at the beginning of period t.
Equation 2 combines the eﬀects of the relative price of investment goods, the rate of





t denotes the price of investment goods relative to the
price of output; (1 − τt)rt is the post-tax—interest being tax deductible—nominal rate of





any expected capital gains (or losses) stemming from the purchase of investment goods. The
last term in equation 2 captures tax considerations associated with the purchase of physical
capital. In particular, ITCt is the tax credit rate allowed on investment expenditures, τt is
the corporate tax rate, and zt captures the present value of the depreciation deduction that
can be subtracted from income for tax purposes.
To date, empirical research on the eﬀects of ﬂuctuations in the cost of capital on invest-
ment spending has encompassed three types of approaches: user-cost speciﬁcations, “natural
experiment” analysis, and Q-theoretic frameworks. In the user-cost speciﬁcations, the em-
pirical regression of interest is formulated as some variant of equation 1 (e.g., Bernanke,
3Bohn, and Reiss [1988] and Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel [1995]).4 Other formulations such
as Caballero [1994], Tevlin and Whelan [2003], and Schaller [2006] exploit cointegrating re-
lationships to identify the long-run eﬀect of the cost of capital on investment, an approach
that relies heavily on the fact that the relative price of capital goods is non-stationary.
In general, changes in other components of the user cost—namely, interest rates and tax
terms—play a modest, if any, role as determinants of investment spending in time-series
models.
Recent work by Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer [2004] combines long-run analysis with
ﬁrm-level panel data estimation techniques to estimate the elasticity of capital to the user
cost. Reported estimates of the long-run elasticity in this literature are frequently lower
than unity and, moreover, tend to be estimated with considerable imprecision. Importantly,
these panel-data studies rely on aggregate interest rates when constructing the user cost.
Thus, cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital is obtained primarily from capital goods
prices that are industry speciﬁc and, to some extent, from tax eﬀects that vary by industry
owing to cross-sectional variation in depreciation rates.
The natural experiments approach adopted by Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard [1994]
focuses on episodes where tax changes are comparatively large and account for nearly all
of the variation in the cost of capital. During such episodes, the elasticity of investment
demand with respect to the user cost is estimated to be quite high. More recently, House
and Shapiro [2006] analyze the impact of recent corporate tax changes—as measured by
bonus depreciation allowances—and document a signiﬁcant user-cost eﬀect at the industry
level. By relying on speciﬁc tax episodes, however, this strand of research has been unable
to provide an explicit link between interest rates and investment spending.
Q-theoretic speciﬁcations rely on a formal description of adjustment costs, along with
assumptions on production technology, to obtain an empirical relationship between invest-
ment and a tax-adjusted measure of Tobin’s Q, which is typically constructed from stock
market data (e.g., Salinger and Summers [1983]). Given the well-documented empirical
failure of the Q-theory, this vein of research provides little guidance to either the short- or
the long-run sensitivity of investment to the cost of capital. Abel and Blanchard [1986],
by contrast, rely on a vector auto-regression (VAR) forecasting system—rather than the
stock market—to construct proxies for future investment opportunities. Their VAR-based
framework considers a linearized model that allows interest rates and output to have inde-
pendent eﬀects on investment. Although the estimated response of investment with respect
to output is high, the estimated response of investment to interest rates is essentially zero,
a ﬁnding consistent with that obtained by Shapiro [1986] from the direct estimation of the
4The empirical implementation generally includes lags of the dependent variable, lags of the output-
capital ratio, and lags of the user cost as additional regressors. Early examples of this approach include Hall
and Jorgenson [1967] and Eisner and Nadiri [1968].
4Euler equations for factor demand.
In a recent paper, Philippon [2007] provides an alternative interpretation of the Q-theory
of investment that utilizes information from the corporate bond market—as opposed to the
the equity market—to construct an empirical proxy for Q. Because bond prices, just like
equity prices, incorporate news about the ﬁrm’s future proﬁtability, Philippon [2007] shows
that bond prices are proportional to Q under some mild assumptions for the stochastic
process of aggregate shocks. According to his results, the empirical performance of the
Q-theory based on corporate bond yields is considerably better compared with its equity-
based counterpart—the yield-based proxy for Q explains more than a half of the volatility in
aggregate investment in the post-war U.S. data and delivers economically plausible estimates
of adjustment costs.
In our approach, we rely on ﬁrm-level data and use yields on the ﬁrm’s outstanding senior
unsecured bonds trading in the secondary market to construct the user cost of capital in
equation 2. For our benchmark results, which are discussed in Section 5, we regress ﬁrm-level
investment spending on measures of the marginal product of capital and our estimate of the
user cost, a measure that incorporates heterogeneity in interest rates across ﬁrms (and time).
The validity of this approach hinges importantly on two related questions: What are the
potential sources of heterogeneity in interest rates across ﬁrms, and how does such cross-
sectional heterogeneity inﬂuence investment ﬁnancing costs? According to the standard
asset pricing theory, cross-sectional heterogeneity in interest rates reﬂects diﬀerences in risk
factors, liquidity premiums, or default risk across ﬁrms. Whereas risk factors and liquidity
premiums inﬂuence ﬁnancing costs but are exogenous with respect to the ﬁrm’s investment
policy, default risk aﬀects the cost of funds only if bankruptcy entails a dead-weight loss. In
this case, default risk may be endogenous to the ﬁrm’s investment policy; moreover, it may
be correlated with unobserved variation in investment opportunities. Controlling for both
the endogeneity and information content of default risk motivates the empirical analysis
provided in Section 6.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent work of Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and
Terlizzese [2002], who rely on ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in bank lending rates to estimate the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial costs on investment decisions of a large panel of Italian ﬁrms. Although
Guiso et al. ﬁnd no eﬀect of interest rates on investment spending using OLS techniques,
they document a negative relationship between interest rates and investment when using
bank-speciﬁc determinants of loan supply as instruments. Whereas Guiso et al. analyze the
investment behavior of small non-publicly-traded Italian ﬁrms for which non-price loans
terms are likely as important as the lending rate, our data, by contrast, focuses on large
publicly-traded U.S. ﬁrms that borrow extensively in the corporate cash market, and whose
combined investment spending broadly matches the investment dynamics in the U.S. econ-
5omy as a whole. In addition, our estimates imply a strong negative relationship between the
user cost and investment when using both simple OLS methods and an IV approach that
takes into account the endogeneity and information content of ﬁrm-speciﬁc default risk.
3 Data Description
Our data set is an unbalanced panel of about 900 publicly-traded ﬁrms in the U.S. nonfarm
nonﬁnancial corporate sector covering the period 1973 to 2005. The distinguishing feature
of these ﬁrms is that a part of their long-term debt—in many cases, a signiﬁcant portion—is
in the form of bonds that are actively traded in the secondary market. For these ﬁrms, we
have linked monthly market prices of their outstanding securities to annual income and
balance sheet statements from Compustat. We now turn to the construction of our key
variables: ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rates and the associated user cost of capital and key income
and balance sheet variables.
3.1 Sources and Methods
3.1.1 Bond Yields
We obtained month-end market prices of outstanding long-term corporate bonds from the
Lehman/Warga (LW) and Merrill Lynch (ML) databases. These two data sources include
prices for a signiﬁcant fraction of dollar-denominated bonds publicly issued in the U.S.
corporate cash market. The ML database is a proprietary data source of daily bond prices
that starts in 1997. Focused on the most liquid securities, bonds in the ML database must
have a remaining term-to-maturity of at least two years, a ﬁxed coupon schedule, and a
minimum amount outstanding of $100 million for below investment-grade and $150 million
for investment-grade issuers. By contrast, the LW database of month-end bond prices has a
somewhat broader coverage and is available from 1973 through mid-1998 (see Warga [1991]
for details).
To ensure that we are measuring long-term ﬁnancing costs of diﬀerent ﬁrms at the same
point in their capital structure, we limited our sample to only senior unsecured issues.
For the securities carrying the senior unsecured rating and with market prices in both the
LW and LM databases, we spliced the option-adjusted eﬀective yields at month-end—a
component of the bond’s yield that is not attributable to embedded options—across the
two data sources. To calculate the credit spreads at each point in time, we matched the
yield on each individual security issued by the ﬁrm to the estimated yield on the Treasury
coupon security of the same maturity. The month-end Treasury yields were taken from the
daily estimates of the U.S. Treasury yield curve reported in G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Wright
[2006]. To mitigate the eﬀect of outliers on our analysis, we eliminated all observations with
6Table 1: Summary Statistics of Bond Characteristics
Variable Mean StdDev Min Median Max
# of bonds per ﬁrm/month 3.39 4.16 1.00 2.00 57.00
Mkt. Value of Issuea ($mil.) 285.3 322.5 1.21 210.5 6,771.1
Maturity at Issue (years) 14.1 9.5 2.0 10.0 50.0
Duration (years) 6.41 2.91 0.01 6.03 29.5
S&P Credit Rating - - D A3 AAA
Coupon Rate (pct) 7.67 2.13 0.00 7.42 16.63
Nominal Yield (pct) 8.00 2.44 1.39 7.67 24.06
Real Yieldb (pct) 4.83 1.81 -3.47 4.71 15.27
Credit Spreadc (bps) 149 135 0 105 1000
Panel Dimensions
Obs. = 316,984 N = 5,800 bonds
Min. Tenure = 1 Median Tenure = 45 Max. Tenure = 229
Notes: Sample period: Monthly data from January 1973 to December 2005. Sample
statistics are based on trimmed data (see text for details).
aMarket value of the outstanding issue deﬂated by the CPI.
bNominal yield less the percent change in previous month’s core CPI from twelve months
prior.
cMeasured relative to comparable maturity Treasury yield (see text for details).
negative credit spreads and with spreads greater than 1,000 basis points. This selection
criterion yielded a sample of 5,800 individual securities, issued by 926 nonﬁnancial ﬁrms
during the 1973–2005 period.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the key characteristics of bonds in our sample.
Note that a typical ﬁrm has only a few senior unsecured issues outstanding at any point
in time—the median ﬁrm, for example, has two such issues trading at any given month.
This distribution, however, exhibits a signiﬁcant positive skew, as some ﬁrms can have
more than ﬁfty diﬀerent senior unsecured bond issues trading in the market at a point in
time. The distribution of the real market values of these issues is similarly skewed, with the
range running from $1.2 million to more than $6.7 billion. Not surprisingly, the maturity of
these debt instruments is fairly long, with the average maturity at issue of about 14 years.
Because corporate bonds typically generate signiﬁcant cash ﬂow in the form of regular
coupon payments, the eﬀective duration is considerably shorter, with both the average and
the median duration of about 7.5 years. Although our sample spans the entire spectrum
of credit quality—from “single D” to “triple A”—the median bond/month observation, at
“A3,” is solidly in the investment-grade category.
Turning to returns, the (nominal) coupon rate on these bonds averaged 7.67 percent
7during our sample period, while the average total nominal return, as measured by the
nominal eﬀective yield, was 8 percent per annum. Reﬂecting the wide range of credit quality,
the distribution of nominal yields is quite wide, with the minimum of about 1.4 percent and
the maximum of more than 24 percent. In real terms, these bonds yielded 4.8 percent per
annum, on average, during our sample period, with the standard deviation of 1.81 percent.5
Relative to Treasuries, an average bond in our sample generated a return of about 150 basis
points above the comparable-maturity risk-free rate, with the standard deviation of 135 basis
points.
Figure 1 depicts the time-series evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of nominal
yields for the bonds in our sample. For comparison, the ﬁgure also shows the nominal
yield on all corporate bonds carrying the Moody’s Baa credit rating. As evidenced by the
closeness of the 95th and 5th percentiles (the shaded band), there is relatively little cross-
sectional dispersion in corporate yields until the second half of the 1980s. The narrowness
of the distribution before the mid-1980s reﬂects the fact that the corporate cash market
during this time period was limited largely to investment-grade issues at the upper end of
the credit-quality spectrum. Indeed, during this period, a signiﬁcant majority of yields in
our sample are consistently below the yield on the Baa-rated corporate bonds, a category
of debt that sits at the bottom rung of the investment-grade ladder.
The increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of corporate interest rates that began in
the second half of the 1980s coincided with the deepening of the market for “junk-rated”
corporate debt. The drift of the aggregate Baa yield towards the center of the cross-sectional
distribution is another piece of evidence pointing to the increased ability of riskier ﬁrms to
tap the corporate cash market. The amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity in our sample
is particularly apparent between 2000 and 2003, a period in which the eﬀects of a cyclical
downturn were compounded by a slew of corporate scandals. This combination of the cross-
sectional heterogeneity in external ﬁnancing costs with considerable cyclical ﬂuctuations are
factors that should enhance our ability to identify variation in the investment supply curve
and thus help us to estimate more precisely the interest sensitivity of investment demand.
5To covert the monthly nominal bond yields into real terms, we employed a simplifying assumption that
the expected inﬂation in period t is equal to the last period’s realized annual core CPI inﬂation. Speciﬁcally,
letting i
k
jt denote the nominal yield (in percent per annum) on bond k of ﬁrm j at the end of month t, we













where CPI denotes the level of the Consumer Price Index, excluding its food and energy components.



















Notes: This ﬁgure depicts the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of nominal bond yields in
our sample. The solid line shows the market-value-weighted median of the cross-sectional distribution of
yields, while the shaded band shows a corresponding measure of cross-sectional dispersion, calculated as
the diﬀerence between the market-value-weighted 95th percentile (P95) and the market-value-weighted
5th percentile (P5) of the distribution. The dotted line shows the aggregate yield on all Baa-rated
corporate bonds. The shaded vertical bars denote the NBER-dated recessions.
3.1.2 User Cost, Income, and Balance Sheet Data
We matched these 5,800 corporate securities with the issuer’s annual income and balance
sheet data from Compustat. Figure 2 compares the aggregate dynamics of investment for
the resulting sample of 926 ﬁrms with those of the U.S. economy as a whole. Note that
until the mid-1980s, the growth of aggregate real investment for the ﬁrms in our sample
diﬀered noticeably from the dynamics of real investment as reported in the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA). The diﬀerences between the two series largely reﬂect the
relatively small number of ﬁrms in our sample during this period—indeed, for the ﬁrst
6 years of our sample period, our panel includes only about 50 ﬁrms per year. By the
mid-1980s, however, the number of ﬁrms of our panel has risen to about 200 per year, and
the two series in Figure 2 became much more closely correlated.
The evidence presented in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that we restrict our empirical analysis
to the last two decades of our sample period. First, the opening of the corporate bond market












Notes: The solid line shows the growth rate of the aggregate real capital expenditures for
the ﬁrms in our sample. The dotted line shows the growth rate of real business ﬁxed investment
measured by the NIPA. Both variables are in chain-weighted (2000=100) dollars. The shaded
vertical bars denote the NBER-dated recessions.
to lower-rated credits, a process that started in the mid-1980s, likely mitigates the sample
selection bias to some extent during this period. Second, starting in the mid-1980s, the
aggregate investment for our sample of ﬁrms tracks fairly closely the investment dynamics
reported in NIPA, an indication that empirical results based on this period have implications
for the U.S. economy as a whole. And lastly, the 3/4-digit North American Industrial
Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) data used to construct the industry-speciﬁc components of
the user cost of capital—namely, the relative price of new capital goods, the depreciation
rate, the capital gains, and the tax considerations—are available only from 1987 onward.
In our analysis, the key component of the user cost of capital in equation 2 is the post-
tax nominal interest rate (1 − τt)rjt, a component that varies across both ﬁrms and time.
As noted in Table 1, eﬀective duration varies widely across our sample of bonds. To ensure
that neither the cross-sectional nor the time-series variation in our ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of
the user cost reﬂects variation in the term premiums, we subtracted from each bond yield
an estimate of the term premium derived from the Treasury yield curve. Speciﬁcally, let rh
jt
denote the eﬀective (nominal) yield of bond h (issued by ﬁrm j) on day t with the duration
10equal to dh




jt − [yt(d∗) − yt(dh
jt)],
where yt(d) denotes the (nominal) yield, on day t, on a zero-coupon Treasury security of
maturity d. We set our target duration d∗ equal to 7 years—around the median duration
in our sample—and we used the daily (month-end) estimates of the zero-coupon Treasury
yield curve from G¨ urkaynak et al. [2006] to compute the term premium yt(d∗) − yt(dk
jt).
Because our income and balance sheet data are available only at an annual frequency,
we converted the monthly bond yields to ﬁrm-level interest rates in two steps. First, we
calculated an average bond yield for ﬁrm j in month t by averaging the duration-adjusted








where Hjt denotes the number of outstanding bond issues of ﬁrm j at the end of month t
and 0 < wh
jt ≤ 1 is the weight for bond issue h. To convert these ﬁrm-level rates to annual
frequency, we then averaged the available monthly yields over the twelve months of the
ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year.6 We used these ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rates to construct an estimate of the
user cost capital C
K
jt in equation 2. As noted above, the remaining components of the user
cost—namely, the relative price of investment goods, the depreciation rate, the capital gains,
and the tax considerations—are allowed to vary across 52 industries as deﬁned by 3/4-digit
NAICS. (Appendix A contains a detailed description of all the industry components of the
user cost of capital.)
Table 2 contains summary statistics for selected variables in our ﬁnal panel data set.
(Appendix B contains a detailed description of the construction of our key variables.) Al-
though our sample focuses on ﬁrms that have both equity and a portion of their long-term
debt traded in capital markets, ﬁrm size—measured by sales or market capitalization—
varies widely in our sample. Not surprisingly, though, most of the ﬁrms in our data set are
quite large. The median ﬁrm has annual real sales of almost $4 billion and a real market
capitalization of about $1.9 billion. Despite the fact that ﬁrms in our sample generally have
only a few senior unsecured bond issues trading at any given point in time, this form of
publicly-traded debt represents a signiﬁcant portion of the long-term debt on their books.
The ratio of the par value of traded bonds outstanding to the book value of total long-term
6For example, for a ﬁrm with ﬁscal year ending in December, the average interest rate in year t is
calculated as an average of the available monthly yields from January through December of the same year.
For a ﬁrm with ﬁscal year ending in, say, June, the average interest rate in year t is calculated as an average
of the available monthly yields from July of year t − 1 through June of year t.
11Table 2: Summary Statistics for Selected Variables
Variable Mean StdDev Min Median Max
Sales ($bil.) 9.34 18.80 < .01 3.89 275.8
Mkt. Capitalization ($bil.) 5.89 12.46 < .01 1.89 172.5
Par Value to L-T Debta 0.45 0.25 < .01 0.42 1.00
Investment to Capitalb 0.18 0.12 0.01 0.15 1.00
Sales to Capitalc 3.50 3.23 0.17 2.65 25.0
Proﬁts to Capitald 0.47 0.39 -0.46 0.36 2.99
Tobin’s Qe 1.62 0.85 0.44 1.37 15.3
User Cost of Capital 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.35
Panel Dimensions
Obs. = 6,398 N = 896 ﬁrms
Min. Tenure = 1 Median Tenure = 6 Max. Tenure = 19
Notes: Sample period: Annual data from 1987 to 2005. Sample statistics are based on
trimmed data, and real (i.e., inﬂation-adjusted) variables are expressed in 2000 dollars (see
Appendix B for details).
aThe ratio of the par value of all of the ﬁrm’s senior unsecured bonds from the LW/ML
database to the book value of its total long-term debt.
bReal investment in period t relative to real capital stock at the beginning of period t.
cReal sales in period t relative to real capital stock at the beginning of period t.
dReal operating income (loss) in period t relative to real capital stock at the beginning
of period t.
eThe ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of total liabilities
at the end of period t to the book value of total assets at the end of period t.
debt on ﬁrms’ balance sheet is, on average, almost one-half (0.47), indicating that market
prices on these outstanding securities likely provide an accurate gauge of the marginal in-
vestment ﬁnancing costs. Taking into account the remaining factors that inﬂuence the cost
of capital yields an average user cost equal to 0.15, with the standard deviation of 0.05.
4 Empirical Speciﬁcation of Investment Equation
Our empirical strategy involves regressing investment on measures of economic fundamentals
and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimate of the user cost of capital calculated using our duration-adjusted
bond yields. In addition to our measures of the user cost and investment fundamentals, we
control for ﬁrm and time ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression analysis. Time ﬁxed eﬀects capture
a common investment component reﬂecting macroeconomic factors, which can inﬂuence
ﬁrm-level investment through either output or interest rates. We include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
in the regression to control for diﬀerences in the average investment rate across ﬁrms.
12Such heterogeneity may arise either because the average level of fundamentals diﬀers, or
because the cost of investing diﬀers across ﬁrms in some systematic way not captured by our
empirical proxies. Finally, for the sake of robustness, we also allow for serial correlation in
the investment process by including lagged investment rate among the explanatory variables.
Our baseline empirical investment equation is given by the semi-log speciﬁcation moti-






= β1 lnZjt + β2 lnC
K
jt +  j + λt + ǫjt, (3)
where [I/K]jt denotes the investment rate of ﬁrm j in period t (i.e., the ratio of real capital
expenditures in period t to the real capital stock at beginning of the period), Zjt is a variable
that measures ﬁrm j’s future investment opportunities (i.e., economic fundamentals), C
K
jt
is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc user cost of capital,  j is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, and λt is a time
dummy. In our baseline case, we assume that the error term ǫjt is orthogonal to current and
past values of Zjt and C
K
jt. To take into account the persistence of the investment process,












+ β1 lnZjt + β1 lnC
K
jt +  j + λt + ǫjt. (4)
Because investment data are positively skewed—which may create heteroskedasticity in ǫjt
across ﬁrms—we also consider a log-log speciﬁcation, which replaces I/K with ln(I/K) in
equations 3 and 4.
In our baseline regressions, we eliminate the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect  j using the standard
“within” transformation. However, the presence of the lagged dependent variable on the
right-hand side of equation 4 implies that the within-ﬁrm regression does not yield consistent



































t denotes the forward mean-diﬀerencing operator
∆
Tj
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k=t+1
Xjk.
13This transformation induces a moving-average component into the original error term
∆
Tj
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k=t+1
ǫjk,
which nevertheless preserves the validity of instruments in the sense that if




t (ǫjt)Xjt |  j,λt] = 0.
Hence, assuming that for k ≥ 0
E[ǫjt lnZj,t−k |  j,λt] = E[ǫjt lnC
K
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= 0,
lagged values of [I/K]j,t−1, along with current and lagged values of lnZjt and lnC
K
jt, are
valid instruments in the presence of the transformed error term ∆
Tj
t (ǫjt). In practice,
however, we do not use all the available lags as instruments, as distant lags are likely to
be poor instruments. Speciﬁcally, our instrument set consists of lags 2 to 5 of [I/K]jt (or
ln[I/K]jt) and lags 2 to 5 of both lnZjt and lnC
K
jt.
In both the static and dynamic speciﬁcations, we measure investment fundamentals
using either the current sales-to-capital ratio [S/K]jt or the operating-income-to-capital
ratio [Π/K]jt.7 Following Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1998], we construct a measure of the


















where φs > 0 and ψs > 0 are appropriately deﬁned scaling factors that are speciﬁc to
the industry s in which the ﬁrm j operates. These scaling constants capture the fact that
sales-to-capital and operating-income-to-capital ratios vary substantially across industries,
whereas in equilibrium, the return on capital should be equalized across industries (see
Appendix B for details). We then set Zjt—our measure of investment fundamentals for
ﬁrm j—equal to each measure of the marginal product of capital.
Taking logs of MPK
S
jt is straightforward. It also implies that the scaling factor φs is
subsumed in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect  j. Because operating income may be negative,
7Both the real sales and the real operating income in period t are scaled by the real capital stock as of
the beginning of period t.
14we use
lnZjt = ln(ξ + MPK
Π
jt)
to measure fundamentals when using operating income as the measure of investment op-
portunities, where ξ is chosen so that ξ + MPK
Π
jt > 0 for all j and t. In this case, we ﬁrst
construct the scale-adjusted marginal product MPK
Π
jt and then compute Zjt for a given
choice of ξ. In principal, estimated elasticities may depend on ξ. In practice, however,
reasonable variation in ξ has no eﬀect on the estimated elasticities, and we conﬁne our
attention to estimates based on ξ = 0.5. One drawback of both MPK measures is that they
are not explicitly forward looking. However, under the assumption that economic funda-
mentals approximately follow an AR(1) process, the current value of the marginal product
of capital summarizes its future path and may, therefore, provide a reasonable measure of
future investment opportunities.
5 Benchmark Results
In this section, we present our benchmark results and examine their robustness using alter-
native speciﬁcations. Our benchmark results are based on the regression speciﬁcation given
in equation 3 and estimated over the 1987–2005 sample period. In addition to the overall
user-cost term lnC
K
jt, we also consider the separate eﬀects of its two main components: the














and the log of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial cost of capital:
ln
 










To gauge the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in interest rates is useful in identi-
fying the elasticity of investment demand with respect to the user cost of capital, we also
consider a measure of the ﬁnancial cost of capital calculated using a common interest rate.
Speciﬁcally, we replace the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate ˜ rjt in the ﬁnancial cost of capital term
with the (nominal) yield on Baa-rated corporate debt (see Figure 1); when constructed
in this manner, the cross-sectional variation in the ﬁnancial cost of capital is due entirely
to diﬀerences in depreciation rates and expected capital gains across industries. Table 3
reports our baseline results for the semi-log speciﬁcation, and Table 4 contains results for
the log-log speciﬁcation. In both tables, entries in columns 2 and 5 are based on the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc measure of the ﬁnancial cost of capital; entries in columns 3 and 5, by contrast, are
15Table 3: Investment and the Cost of Capital
(Static Speciﬁcation, 1987–2005)
Semi-Log Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMPK
S








jt -0.113 - - -0.072 - -
(0.016) (0.015)
Relative Pricea - -0.126 -0.126 - -0.084 -0.083
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
Financial Costb - -0.095 -0.026 - -0.054 0.017
(0.015) (0.027) (0.017) (0.023)
L-R Elasticityc -1.111 - - -1.323 - -
(0.116) (0.293)
Pr > Fd - 0.240 0.003 - 0.220 0.000
R2 (within) 0.249 0.250 0.242 0.224 0.224 0.222
BICe -14.70 -14.70 -14.63 -14.49 -14.48 -14.46
Panel Dimensions Obs = 6,398 N = 898 ¯ T = 7.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the real investment rate [I/K]jt. All speciﬁcations include
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (µj) and time ﬁxed eﬀects (λt) and are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are computed according to Arellano [1987] and
are reported in parentheses. Parameter estimates for lnMPK
Π and the associated standard errors are
adjusted for the fact that the log of MPK
Π
jt is computed as ln(0.5 + MPK
Π
jt).
aThe industry-speciﬁc relative price of capital is adjusted for the tax treatment of capital expendi-
tures (see text for details).
bIn columns 2 and 5, the ﬁnancial cost of capital is constructed using ﬁrm-speciﬁc bond yields. In
columns 3 and 6, the ﬁnancial cost of capital is constructed using the aggregate yield on Baa-rated
corporate bonds (see text for details).
cEstimate of the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost (see text for details).
Standard errors are computed according to the delta method.
dp-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on the tax-adjusted relative price of
capital is equal to the coeﬃcient on the ﬁnancial cost of capital.
eSchwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (smaller is better).
based on the ﬁnancial cost of capital calculated using the common Baa corporate yield.
According to entries in Tables 3 and 4, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of the user cost of
capital is an economically important and statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variable for
investment in all speciﬁcations. For either the semi-log or log-log speciﬁcation (columns
1 and 4 in Tables 3 and 4), a 1 percentage point increase in the user cost of capital implies a
reduction in the average rate of investment between 50 to 75 basis points, depending on the
16speciﬁcation. The investment fundamentals—as measured by our proxies for the marginal
product of capital—are also economically important determinants of capital spending, with
coeﬃcients that are estimated with considerable precision. In both the semi-log and log-log
speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient on the user cost is essentially equal to (minus) the coeﬃcient on
the marginal product of capital. As a result, the long-run elasticity of capital with respect
to the user cost, calculated as the ratio of these two elasticities, is estimated to be -1.11 and
-1.32 in the semi-log speciﬁcations and -1.02 and -1.04 in the log-log speciﬁcation. Note that
from a statistical perspective, all estimates of the long-run elasticities are indistinguishable
from unity, a result consistent with the Cobb-Douglas production technology.
We now consider the eﬀect of decomposing the user cost into its separate components:
the tax-adjusted price eﬀect and the ﬁnancial cost. The ﬁrst set of estimates based on this
exercise utilize ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rates to construct the ﬁnancial cost (columns 2 and 5 of
Tables 3 and 4. The second set of estimates, by contrast, relies on the common Baa interest
rate (columns 3 and 6 of Tables 3 and 4).
When using ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rates to construct the ﬁnancial cost of capital, our
estimates imply that both components of the user cost—the price eﬀect and the ﬁnancing
cost—have economically large and statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on investment.
In addition, the estimated coeﬃcients on the two components are very similar in size across
all speciﬁcations. This result is especially apparent in the log-log speciﬁcation, where the
estimates of the price and ﬁnancing cost eﬀects are -0.758 and -0.686, respectively, when
using the sales-based measure of MPK, and -0.461 and -0.477, when using the proﬁt-based
measure of MPK to control for the investment fundamentals. Indeed, we do not reject the re-
striction that the price and ﬁnancing cost eﬀects are equal in magnitude in all speciﬁcations.
Moreover, we do not reject the restriction that these coeﬃcients are equal and opposite in
sign to the coeﬃcient on the marginal product of capital. Thus all three variables—the
marginal product of capital, the tax-adjusted relative price, and the ﬁnancial cost—provide
distinct information regarding investment fundamentals, and they all have essentially the
same economic impact on the ﬁrm-level investment decisions.8 These results stand in sharp
contrast to those obtained when we consider the eﬀect of ﬁnancial cost based on the com-
mon interest rate. Indeed, when using the aggregate Baa corporate yield to construct the
ﬁnancial cost of capital, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the associated coeﬃ-
cient is zero in all speciﬁcations (columns 3 and 6 in Tables 3 and 4). These results clearly
illustrate the diﬃculty of estimating the user-cost elasticity of investment demand in the
absence of variation in interest rates across ﬁrms.
In summary, our benchmark estimates imply that movements in the user cost of capital
8As further conﬁrmation of these results, we also considered regressions of the investment rate on each
term separately. In all cases, we obtained coeﬃcient estimates that were almost identical to those reported
in columns 2 and 5 of Tables 3 and 4.
17Table 4: Investment and the Cost of Capital
(Static Speciﬁcation, 1987–2005)
Log-Log Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnMPK
S








jt -0.729 - - -0.477 - -
(0.078) (0.072)
Relative Pricea - -0.758 -0.761 - -0.488 -0.488
(0.114) (0.114) (0.095) (0.096)
Financial Costb - -0.686 -0.222 - -0.459 0.045
(0.089) (0.154) (0.100) (0.126)
L-R Elasticityc -1.023 - - -1.072 - -
(0.116) (0.177)
Pr > Fd - 0.605 0.004 - 0.827 0.001
R2 (within) 0.308 0.308 0.293 0.244 0.244 0.237
BICe 56.38 56.46 57.84 62.02 62.11 62.71
Panel Dimensions Obs = 6,398 N = 898 ¯ T = 7.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the real investment rate ln[I/K]jt. All speciﬁcations
include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (µj) and time ﬁxed eﬀects (λt) and are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity-
and autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are computed according to Arellano [1987]
and are reported in parentheses. Parameter estimates for lnMPK
Π and the associated standard errors
are adjusted for the fact that the log of MPK
Π
jt is computed as ln(0.5 + MPK
Π
jt).
aThe industry-speciﬁc relative price of capital is adjusted for the tax treatment of capital expendi-
tures (see text for details).
bIn columns 2 and 5, the ﬁnancial cost of capital is constructed using ﬁrm-speciﬁc bond yields. In
columns 3 and 6, the ﬁnancial cost of capital is constructed using the aggregate yield on Baa-rated
corporate bonds (see text for details).
cEstimate of the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost (see text for details).
Standard errors are computed according to the delta method.
dp-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on the tax-adjusted relative price of
capital is equal to the coeﬃcient on the ﬁnancial cost of capital.
eSchwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (smaller is better).
have a strong negative eﬀect on investment spending. Furthermore, the tax-adjusted relative
price of investment goods and the ﬁnancial cost of capital constructed using ﬁrm-speciﬁc
interest rates contain independent information about the marginal cost of investment. Ac-
cording to our estimates, investment responds to the changes in marginal costs in essentially
the same manner as it does to the changes in economic fundamentals, as measured by our
proxies for the marginal product of capital. As a result, the long-run elasticity of capital
18with respect to the user cost is estimated to be unity.
5.1 Alternative Speciﬁcations
We now consider two alternative investment speciﬁcations. First, we allow for richer dy-
namics in the investment process by including a lagged dependent variable in the regression
equation. Second, we allow the response of investment to both the fundamentals and the
user cost of capital to diﬀer across sectors. In both alternatives, we conﬁne our attention
to investment equations that include the marginal product of capital and the user cost as
explanatory variables.
Table 5 reports coeﬃcient estimates of the forward mean-diﬀerenced dynamic speci-
ﬁcation given in equation 4. As expected, the inclusion of the lagged investment rate
tends to reduce somewhat the coeﬃcient estimates for both the user cost and the marginal
product of capital. The two coeﬃcients, however, are still economically important and
highly statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. Moreover, taking account of investment
dynamics—that is, dividing the coeﬃcients on the user cost and the marginal product of
capital by (1−α)—actually implies a greater sensitivity of investment to both the user cost
and fundamentals compared with the static case. Consistent with our benchmark results,
the estimated long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost is again close to
unity.
Results in Table 6 are based the speciﬁcation that allows the coeﬃcient on the marginal
product of capital and the user cost to vary across sectors based on 2-digit NAICS.9 For
the sake of brevity, we report results for the log-log speciﬁcation only, using MPK
Π as our
measure of investment fundamentals. According to the entries in the table, the elasticity of
investment to the user cost of capital is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in all sectors,
except in the information sector.10 Thus, our ﬁnding that an increase in the user cost has
a strong negative impact on investment spending is broad-based and is not driven by a
small number of observations or data from a single sector. By far, the two largest sectors
in our sample—both in terms of number of ﬁrms and percentage of economic activity—
are the nondurable and durable goods manufacturing.11 For these two sectors, our results
9Because of a small number of service ﬁrms in our panel, our deﬁnition of the service sector includes
the following 2-digit NAICS sectors: Professional, Scientiﬁc, and Technical Services (54); Administrative
and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services (56); Healthcare and Social Assistance (62);
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71); Accommodation and Food Services (72); and Other Services,
except Public Administration (81).
10The information sector (NAICS 2-digit code 51) does not include the information technology (IT) indus-
tries, which fall into durable goods manufacturing. The information sector includes the following sub-sectors:
Publishing Industries, except Internet; Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries; Broadcasting, ex-
cept Internet; Telecommunications; Internet Service Providers; and Other Information Services.
11The 434 manufacturing ﬁrms account for 51 percent of real capital expenditures and 60 percent of real
sales during our sample period.
19Table 5: Investment and the Cost of Capital
(Dynamic Speciﬁcation, 1987–2005)
Semi-Log Speciﬁcation Log-Log Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
lnMPK
S








jt -0.105 -0.076 -0.513 -0.400
(0.032) (0.031) (0.142) (0.137)
[I/K]j,t−1 0.311 0.342 0.450 0.472
(0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
L-R Elasticitya -0.970 -1.237 -1.122 -1.368
(0.286) (0.558) (0.294) (0.475)
Pr > |m1|b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pr > |m2|c 0.540 0.393 0.693 0.458
Pr > JN
d 0.993 0.974 0.993 0.989
Panel Dimensions Obs = 3,876 N = 642 ¯ T = 6.0
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the real investment rate [I/K]jt.
In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the log of real investment rate ln[I/K]jt. All
speciﬁcations time ﬁxed eﬀects (λt) and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (µj), which are eliminated us-
ing the forward mean-diﬀerencing transformation. The resulting speciﬁcation is estimated
by GMM using a one-step weighting matrix; see Arellano [2003]. Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. Param-
eter estimate for lnMPK
Π and the associated standard errors are adjusted for the fact that
the log of MPK
Π
jt is computed as ln(0.5 + MPK
Π
jt).
aEstimate of the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost (see text for
details). Standard errors are computed according to the delta method.
bp-value for the test of the ﬁrst-order serial correlation of the transformed residuals.
cp-value for the test of the second-order serial correlation of the transformed residuals.
dp-value for the Hansen [1982] test of the over-identifying restrictions. This test uses
the minimized objective of the corresponding two-step GMM estimator.
imply long-run elasticities that are again close to unity. Relative to the two manufacturing
sectors, the coeﬃcient estimate on the user cost in the information sector is estimated with
a substantial degree of imprecision. We suspect that the positive coeﬃcient, as well as the
imprecision of the estimate, reﬂect the diﬃculty of distinguishing capital goods prices from
industry-level output prices in this sector.
Thus far, our results imply a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the user cost of capital on investment
spending in both the short and the long run. According to our benchmark estimates, a
1 percentage point increase in the user cost leads to a decline in the rate of investment
20Table 6: Investment and the Cost of Capital
(Static Log-Log Sectoral Speciﬁcation, 1987–2005)
Elasticity of Investment Demand
With respect to MPK
Π With respect to C
K
Sector Obs/N Est. StdErr Est. StdErr
Mining 253/43 0.469 0.113 -0.249 0.109
Utilities 542/74 0.365 0.123 -0.282 0.222
Construction 40/7 0.440 0.247 -0.350 0.613
Mfg. (nondurable) 1,781/212 0.572 0.050 -0.722 0.111
Mfg. (durable) 1,649/222 0.482 0.039 -0.522 0.108
Wholesale Trade 163/24 0.915 0.211 -1.143 0.465
Retail Trade 528/70 0.569 0.109 -1.237 0.424
Transportation 372/47 0.458 0.172 -0.588 0.149
Information 662/118 0.488 0.104 0.335 0.307
Services 408/79 0.646 0.105 -0.616 0.371





All speciﬁcations include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (µj) and time ﬁxed eﬀects (λt) and are estimated by
OLS. Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are computed
according to Arellano [1987]. Parameter estimates for lnMPK
Π and the associated standard errors
are adjusted for the fact that the log of MPK
Π
jt is computed as ln(0.5 + MPK
Π
jt).
spending of 50 to 75 basis points. Because the after-tax interest rate is, on average, about
two-thirds of the user cost, our estimates imply that a 1 percentage point increase in the
real long-term interest rate induces a reduction in the rate of investment of 30 to 50 basis
points in the short run. The elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost is equal to
unity in the long run.
6 Endogeneity of Interest Rates
An important concern when estimating equation 4 is the potential endogeneity—reﬂecting
both macroeconomic and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors—between investment and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
interest rate used to construct the user cost of capital. The endogeneity at the macroeco-
nomic level arises because long-term interest rates and the price of new investment goods
typically fall during economic downturns when investment fundamentals are weak. If our
proxies for investment fundamentals are subject to measurement error, the residual in the
investment regression will capture the omitted factors—in this case, the residual is likely
to be negatively correlated with the user cost. Macroeconomic considerations thus suggest
that endogeneity between prices and quantities leads to a downward bias in the estimate of
21the elasticity of investment demand with respect to the user cost of capital. Using ﬁrm-level
data, however, allows us to control for such biases by including time dummies to capture
these macroeconomic co-movements.
The endogeneity at the ﬁrm level arises because variation in interest rates is due in
part to the endogenous decisions made by ﬁrms when jointly determining their investment
and ﬁnancial policies. Such endogeneity leads to two types of biases. First, there is the
potential for omitted variable bias owing to mismeasured fundamentals. Improvements
in fundamentals are likely to increase investment, reduce the likelihood of future default,
and, therefore, raise the price of the ﬁrm’s outstanding bonds. Thus, with mismeasured
fundamentals, corporate yields may fall while investment spending rises, a reﬂection of the
endogenous response of interest rates and investment to unobservables. The presence of
such endogeneity would imply an upward bias in the sensitivity of investment demand to
the user cost of capital. Second, an increase in investment—everything else equal—may
lead to higher leverage if ﬁrms ﬁnance a portion of their capital expenditures with external
funds. The increased leverage would raise the likelihood of default, causing an increase
in the yield on outstanding corporate debt. This bias, in contrast, would result in the
estimated sensitivity of investment demand to the user cost of capital to be biased toward
zero. In both cases, however, the endogenous response of interest rates is fully reﬂected in
changes to the expected default risk.
In this section, we address this endogeneity issue in two speciﬁc ways. First, we construct
an instrument for the cost of capital that is arguably exogenous to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
policy—that is, we compute the variation in interest rates that is orthogonal to the expected
default risk and therefore exogenous to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy. Second, in order to control
for omitted variable bias, we include additional explanatory variables in the investment
regression.
6.1 Investment and Default Risk
Our measure of the probability that a ﬁrm will default within a certain period of time
comes from the Moody’s/KMV Corporation (MKMV). The theoretical underpinnings for
these probabilities of default are provided by the seminal work of Merton [1973, 1974].
According to this option-theoretic approach, the probability that a ﬁrm will default on
its debt obligations at any point in the future is determined by three major factors: the
market value of the ﬁrm’s assets, the standard deviation of the stochastic process for the
market value of assets (i.e., asset volatility), and the ﬁrm’s leverage. These three factors
are combined into a single measure of default risk called distance to default.
In theory, the default point should equal the book value of total liabilities, implying that
the distance to default compares the net worth of the ﬁrm with the size of a one-standard-
22deviation move in the ﬁrm’s asset value.12 The market value of assets and the volatility
of assets, however, are not directly observable, so they have to be computed in order to
calculate the distance to default. Assuming that the ﬁrm’s assets are traded, the market
value of the ﬁrm’s equity can be viewed as a call option on the ﬁrm’s assets with the strike
price equal to the current book value of the ﬁrm’s total debt.13 Using this insight, MKMV
“backs out” the market value and the volatility of assets from a proprietary variant of the
Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model, employing the observed book value of liabilities
and the market value of equity as inputs; see Crosbie and Bohn [2003] for details.
In the ﬁnal step, MKMV transforms the distance to default into an expected probability
of default—the so-called expected default frequency (EDF)—using an empirical distribution
of actual defaults. Speciﬁcally, MKMV estimates a mapping relating the likelihood of
default over a particular horizon to various levels of distance to default, employing an
extensive proprietary database of historical defaults and bankruptcies in the United States.14
These EDFs are calculated monthly and in our case measure the probability that a ﬁrm
will default on its debt obligations over the subsequent 12 months. We used EDFs as of the
last month of the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year when merging MKMV data to the annual Compustat
data ﬁles. Because they are based primarily on equity valuations, EDF-based measures of
default risk react rapidly to deterioration in the ﬁrm’s credit quality and promptly reﬂect
changes in aggregate economic conditions.
Using the information on ﬁrm-speciﬁc probabilities of default, we propose a methodology
that identiﬁes variation in ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rates, and hence in the user cost of capital,
that is orthogonal to default risk as well as macroeconomic risk factors that inﬂuence the
price of such risk. According to standard asset pricing theory, the spread of corporate
yields over yields on comparable maturity risk-free bonds—the credit spread—measures
the compensation that holders of corporate bonds demand for the expected cost of default,
which equals the expected default probability times the recovery rate (i.e., EDF × R).
However, as pointed out by Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann [2001] and Huang and Huang
[2003], the actual corporate credit spreads are considerably wider than can be explained
by observed probabilities of default and historical recovery rates on the defaulted bonds.15
12Empirically, however, MKMV has found that most defaults occur when the market value of the ﬁrm’s
assets drops to the value equal to the sum of the ﬁrm’s current liabilities and one-half of long-term liabilities
(i.e., Default Point = Current Liabilities + 0.5 × Long-Term Liabilities), and the default point is calibrated
accordingly.
13The assumption that all of the ﬁrm’s assets are traded is clearly inappropriate in most cases. Neverthe-
less, as shown by Ericsson and Reneby [2004], this approach is still valid provided that at least one of the
ﬁrm’s securities (e.g., equity) is traded.
14The MKMV’s mapping of distances to default to EDFs restricts the probability estimates to the range
between 0.02 percent and 20 percent because of sparse data beyond these points. We omitted observations
with EDFs at the boundary from our analysis.
15According to these studies, other most important constituents of credit spreads are tax and liquidity
premiums. Relatedly, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin [2001] show that changes in credit spreads are
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Notes: This ﬁgure depicts the time-series of the cross-sectional average credit spread—the solid
line—and the cross-sectional average of the year-ahead expected default frequency (EDF)—dotted
line—for the ﬁrms in our sample. The shaded vertical bars denote the NBER-dated recessions.
Indeed, this feature can be seen in Figure 3, which depicts the evolution of the average
year-ahead EDF and the average credit spreads for the ﬁrms in our sample. Although this
measure of expected default risk is, in general, highly correlated with the corporate credit
spreads, during economic downturns or periods of heightened volatility in ﬁnancial markets,
spreads tend to increase considerably more than the likelihood of default.
To compute the variation in interest rates that is orthogonal to the expected default risk
and therefore exogenous to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy, we follow Berndt, Douglas, Duﬃe,
Ferguson, and Schranz [2005] and estimate a log-log speciﬁcation of the form:
ln(rjtm − ytm) = cjtm + θlnEDFjtm + Rjtm + ftm + ujtm, (6)
where rjtm denotes the portfolio yield on the ﬁrm j’s outstanding bonds in month tm, ytm is
the average yield on the Treasury securities of the same maturity, and EDFjtm denotes the
year-ahead expected default frequency for ﬁrm j, measured at the beginning of the month
tm. To control for diﬀerences in recovery rates Rjtm and macro risk factors ftm, we include
a full set of industry (3/4-digit NAICS) and time dummies in the regression equation 6.16
inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by movements in macro risk factors and a time-varying liquidity premium.
16We also considered adding higher-order polynomial terms of lnEDFjtm to the right-hand side of the
24We also augment our option-theoretic measures of expected default risk in equation 6
with default information from external ratings agencies. Because they are based mainly
on movements in equity valuations, the EDFs incorporate high-frequency information re-
garding default risk. By contrast, external ratings of ﬁrms’ senior unsecured debt contain
low-frequency information that reﬂects a variety of ﬁrm and industry-speciﬁc factors not
captured by the distance to default. In addition, credit ratings are based on a borrower’s
ability to meet its debt obligations in the event of an economic downturn and therefore con-
tain information about the likelihood of default over a longer horizon (e.g., L¨ oﬄer [2007]).
Speciﬁcally, letting n = 1,2,...,N index the N distinct credit ratings (i.e., AAA, AA, A,
etc.), we incorporate this additional information about the ﬁrm-speciﬁc likelihood of de-
fault by adding to the set of regressors a full set of dummy variables that measure the ﬁrm’s
rating of its senior unsecured debt. We do so by specifying that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc term cjtm





where 1(Bjtm = n) is the indicator function for ﬁrm j’s credit rating Bjtm and the beginning
of month tm. The parameter γn, therefore, provides an estimate of the average credit spread
for rating category n = 1,2,...,N in month tm, conditional on expected default.
The residual from the regression equation 6, ujtm, is our measure of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
liquidity premium.17 The key requirement for ujtm to be a valid instrument for the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc user cost in the investment equation 5 is that these liquidity shocks are not correlated
with the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities. Note that ujtm is, by construction, orthogonal
to the expected default risk as measured by both the EDF and the ﬁrm’s external credit
rating. By employing as an instrument a variable that is orthogonal to the main source
of potential endogeneity considered in the asset pricing literature—namely default risk—it
seems quite reasonable to assume that these liquidity shocks are not determined by the
ﬁrm’s investment opportunities and, consequently, can be used to address the endogeneity
between investment demand and the user cost of capital.
Because our investment data are on an annual basis, we construct our instrument—
regression equation 6, because the relationship between corporate spreads and default risk, even in a log-log
speciﬁcation, may not be linear. However, the inﬂuence of these higher-order terms on the relationship
between credit spreads and default risk was negligible, and all of our results were completely robust to this
alternative speciﬁcation.
17Berndt et al. [2005] use credit-default swap (CDS) data to determine the price of default risk by regressing
the CDS spread on MKMV’s expected default frequency. Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh [2005] argue that
corporate bond prices suﬀer from liquidity premia owing to the limited supply of each ﬁrm’s bonds at
diﬀerent maturities. Because credit-default swaps are derivatives, they are less likely to suﬀer from liquidity
premia when traded in the secondary market. Indeed, Blanco et al. [2005] and use the gap between the
bond price and the credit default swap—the so-called basis—as their measure of a liquidity premium, an
approach consistent with our proposed methodology.
25that is, the average annual liquidity shock—as ˆ ujt =
 12
m=1 ˆ ujtm. These instruments are
constructed to match each ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year and thus reﬂect information within the ﬁscal
year about ﬂuctuations in ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rates. As a result, they are correlated with
the user cost of capital C
K
jt and, according to our argument, uncorrelated with ǫjt, the
unobservable component of the investment demand equation. They may, therefore, be
used as valid instruments to estimate the forward mean-diﬀerenced regression speciﬁed in
equation 4. Formally, we are replacing the orthogonality condition E[ǫjtC
K
j,t−k |  j,λt] = 0
with the orthogonality condition E[ǫjtˆ uj,t−k |  j,λt] = 0, for k ≥ 0, which implies that
current (and lagged) values of our liquidity shock ˆ ujt are valid instruments for the forward
mean-diﬀerenced error term ∆
Tj
t (ǫjt). Because the MKMV data are only available from
January 1991 onwards, our results are based on the 1991–2005 sub-period. We ﬁrst report
estimates of the yield spread regression 6. Then we re-estimate the dynamic speciﬁcation
reported in Table 5 for the 1991–2005 period using liquidity shocks as instruments.
Table 7 reports the regression results from estimating the yield spread equation 6. We
consider four separate speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation only includes the log of the
expected default frequency. We then augment this baseline speciﬁcation sequentially with
industry ﬁxed eﬀects, time ﬁxed eﬀects, and credit-rating variables. As noted in the ﬁrst
column, the EDF term alone yields an R2 of 0.483, a goodness-of-ﬁt similar to that re-
ported by Berndt et al. [2005] who used credit default swap spreads in place of spreads
on outstanding corporate bonds. Although industry ﬁxed eﬀects do not appear to have a
large impact, the addition of the time dummies—included to capture variation in macro
risk factors—signiﬁcantly improves the ﬁt of the regression and implies a modest reduction
in the coeﬃcient on the EDF. Finally, the inclusion of credit-rating dummies substantially
reduces the eﬀect of the expected default frequency and signiﬁcantly raises the explana-
tory power of the regression. With all four factors included, the regression explains almost
76 percent of the monthly variation in the corporate credit spreads.
Figure 4 displays the impact of the credit-rating indicators on yield spreads from spec-
iﬁcation 4 in Table 7.18 As expected, these estimates imply a strong negative relationship
between external credit ratings and corporate yield spreads. Our estimates imply a diﬀer-
ential in yield spreads between C-rated and AAA-rated ﬁrms of more than 200 basis points,
on average, with most of this diﬀerence occurring between the CCC1 and AA3 rating cat-
egories.
We now consider the eﬀect of instrumenting the user cost of capital with our estimates of
18Because the dependent variable is in logs, the impact of the credit rating n on the level of yield spreads
is given by exp(ˆ γn − V (ˆ γn)) − 1, where ˆ γn is the estimated coeﬃcient on a dummy variable associated with
rating n and V (ˆ γn) is the estimated variance of ˆ γn (cf., Kennedy [1981]. In addition, we restricted the sum
of coeﬃcients on each set of dummy variables (i.e., industry, time, and credit rating) to sum to zero. The
estimated coeﬃcients in Figure 4 thus measure the eﬀect of each credit rating relative to the average rating
eﬀect.
26Table 7: Credit Spreads and Default Risk
Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 3.662 3.737 4.207 5.776
(0.028) (0.084) (0.091) (0.088)
lnEDFj,t−1 0.393 0.386 0.359 0.119
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Industry Eﬀectsa no yes yes yes
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Eﬀectsb no no yes yes
(0.000) (0.000)
Ratings Eﬀectsc no no no yes
(0.000)
R2 0.483 0.509 0.576 0.755
BICd 94.83 92.36 85.95 54.25
Panel Dimensions Obs = 58,037 N = 872 ¯ T = 66.6
Notes: Estimation period: Monthly data from February 1991 to Decem-
ber 2005. Dependent variable is the log of the credit spread ln(rjt − yjt). All
speciﬁcations are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-
consistent asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses.
ap-values for the test of the null hypothesis of the absence of industry ﬁxed
eﬀects are reported in parentheses.
bp-values for the test of the null hypothesis of the absence of time ﬁxed eﬀects
are reported in parentheses.
cp-values for the test of the null hypothesis of the absence of credit-rating
ﬁxed eﬀects (as of the beginning-of-period t) are reported in parentheses.
dSchwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (smaller is better).
liquidity shocks. We focus on the dynamic speciﬁcation that uses forward mean-diﬀerencing
to eliminate the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect  j. The forward mean-diﬀerencing allows us to instrument
the user cost without imposing the additional assumption that the current error term in
the investment equation is orthogonal to future information that may be reﬂected in the
bond market through liquidity shocks. Table 8 reports results for this dynamic speciﬁcation
estimated over the 1991–2005 sample period.
Remarkably, using the liquidity shock as an instrument causes the coeﬃcient on the user
cost to increase in magnitude for three out of the four speciﬁcations reported in Table 8.
The coeﬃcient is essentially unchanged for the log-log speciﬁcation that uses MPK
Π
jt to
measure the marginal product of capital. Although diﬀerences in the estimates reported
in Tables 5 and 8 are not statistically signiﬁcant, our instrumental variable results imply




































Notes: This ﬁgure depicts the estimated eﬀect of external credit ratings on corporate yield spreads
from speciﬁcation 4 in Table 7. The rating eﬀects shown are measured relative to the average rating
eﬀect (see text for details).
that our benchmark estimates of the user-cost eﬀect are unlikely to be biased to the upside
because of the endogeneity between interest rates and the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy. The higher
estimated coeﬃcient on the user cost also reduces somewhat our estimate of the long-run
elasticity of capital. In none of these cases, however, can we reject the hypothesis that the
long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost is unity.
6.2 Investment, the Cost of Capital, and Other Factors
An alternative to the instrumental variables approach discussed above is to include addi-
tional explanatory variables—which capture the potentially omitted information—in the
regression. The variables we consider are Tobin’s Q and expected default risk as measured
by EDFs. Because both Tobin’s Q and EDFs are based on stock market data, they are
forward-looking variables and, consequently, may contain information about future invest-
ment opportunities not captured by our current measures of the marginal product of capital.
Thus, including Tobin’s Q and EDFs in the regression provides another way to address the
potential endogeneity between interest rates, investment opportunities, and ﬁnancial policy
that motivated our original instrumental variables procedure.
Because the investment data are annual, we augment the regression with the EDF
and Tobin’s Q constructed using the information as of the beginning of the period; the
28Table 8: Investment, Cost of Capital, and Liquidity Shocks
(Dynamic Speciﬁcation, 1991–2005)
Semi-Log Speciﬁcation Log-Log Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
lnMPK
S








jt -0.204 -0.148 -0.749 -0.405
(0.054) (0.046) (0.226) (0.180)
[I/K]j,t−1 0.276 0.329 0.439 0.444
(0.051) (0.050) (0.043) (0.048)
L-R Elasticitya -0.747 -0.890 -0.895 -1.065
(0.193) (0.302) (0.209) (0.433)
Pr > |m1|b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pr > |m2|c 0.663 0.402 0.867 0.666
Pr > JN
d 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.992
Panel Dimensions Obs = 3,076 N = 581 ¯ T = 5.3
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the real investment rate [I/K]jt.
In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the log of real investment rate ln[I/K]jt. All
speciﬁcations time ﬁxed eﬀects (λt) and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (µj), which are eliminated us-
ing the forward mean-diﬀerencing transformation. The resulting speciﬁcation is estimated
by GMM using a one-step weighting matrix; see Arellano [2003]. Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. Param-
eter estimate for lnMPK
Π and the associated standard errors are adjusted for the fact that
the log of MPK
Π
jt is computed as ln(0.5 + MPK
Π
jt).
aEstimate of the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost (see text for
details). Standard errors are computed according to the delta method.
bp-value for the test of the ﬁrst-order serial correlation of the transformed residuals.
cp-value for the test of the second-order serial correlation of the transformed residuals.
dp-value for the Hansen [1982] test of the over-identifying restrictions. This test uses
the minimized objective of the corresponding two-step GMM estimator.
EDF thus measures the likelihood of default over the coming year. This contrasts with
our instrumental variables procedure, which allowed us to exploit the relationship between
credit spreads and expected default risk at a monthly frequency, thus yielding an instrument
that was constructed using information in the ﬁscal year in which the investment was
made. Because the two approaches rely on a diﬀerent information structure, each should
be informative regarding potential biases in our regression analysis.19
19Recall that when using liquidity shocks as instruments, we restricted our analysis to the forward mean-
diﬀerenced speciﬁcation to ensure that our instrument was truly orthogonal to the transformed error term,
29Table 9: Investment, the Cost of Capital, and Other Factors
(Static Speciﬁcation, 1991–2005)
Semi-Log Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnMPK
Π
jt 0.100 0.080 0.089 0.093 0.086
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
lnC
K
jt -0.077 -0.064 -0.075 -0.064 -0.066
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
lnQ
A VG




jt - - 0.064 0.046
(0.010) (0.011)
lnEDFj,t−1 - - - -0.015 -0.010
(0.002) (0.003)
R2 (within) 0.247 0.294 0.310 0.287 0.317
Log-Log Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnMPK
Π
jt 0.539 0.440 0.460 0.500 0.442
(0.036) (0.042) (0.048) (0.041) (0.048)
lnC
K
jt -0.511 -0.464 -0.479 -0.450 -0.417
(0.093) (0.092) (0.121) (0.102) (0.121)
lnQ
A VG




jt - - 0.368 0.246
(0.051) (0.059)
lnEDFj,t−1 - - - -0.096 -0.069
(0.014) (0.017)
R2 (within) 0.268 0.311 0.324 0.305 0.335
Notes: In the semi-log speciﬁcations, the dependent variable is the real in-
vestment rate [I/K]jt. In the log-log speciﬁcations, the dependent variable is the
log of real investment rate ln[I/K]jt. All speciﬁcations include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
(µj) and time ﬁxed eﬀects (λt) and are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are computed according to
Arellano [1987] and are reported in parentheses. Parameter estimate for lnMPK
Π
and the associated standard errors are adjusted for the fact that the log of MPK
Π
jt
is computed as ln(0.5 + MPK
Π
jt).
In the regression that includes Tobin’s Q, we consider two alternative ways to measure Q.
given that liquidity shocks use contemporaneous information. In the augmented regression, by contrast,
we use beginning-of-period values of Tobin’s Q and the EDF, and we are, therefore, less concerned about
30The ﬁrst measure—denoted by Q
A VG—uses the sum of the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity
and the book value of its debt, divided by the replacement value of capital. The numerator in
the second measure—denoted by Q
KMV—is equal to the market value of the ﬁrm calculated
by MKMV using the Merton model discussed above. To our knowledge, we are ﬁrst to use
this measure of Tobin’s Q in an investment regression.20
Estimation results from this exercise are reported in Table 9. Because EDFs are only
available from January 1991 onwards, we again restrict our attention to the 1991–2005
period. The top panel of the table reports estimates using the semi-log speciﬁcation, whereas
the bottom panel reports estimates using the log-log speciﬁcation. According to the entries
in the table, Tobin’s Q adds explanatory power to the regression, with point estimates that
are highly statistically signiﬁcant and of the magnitude consistent with previous studies.
Importantly, the addition of the Tobin’s Q to the regression has very little eﬀect on the
parameter estimates associated with the user cost and the marginal product of capital,
regardless of the measure of Tobin’s Q used.
The expected default frequency also adds explanatory power to the investment regres-
sion. The coeﬃcient on the EDF is statistically signiﬁcant but economically unimportant—
given an average default rate of 1 percent and an average investment rate of 18 percent, a
1 percentage point increase in expected default implies a reduction in the rate of investment
of just 2 basis points. Whereas the beginning-of-period expected default risk does provide
independent information relative to the user cost, the parameter estimate on the user cost
is unaﬀected by the inclusion of the EDF variable. The results in Table 9 thus provide
further evidence against the possibility that our benchmark estimates of the user-cost eﬀect
are biased, owing to either omitted variable bias or endogeneity issues related to the joint
determination of the ﬁrm’s investment and ﬁnancial policy.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we employed a newly constructed data set linking ﬁrm-speciﬁc bond prices
and default probabilities to balance sheet and income statement data in order to study the
eﬀect of variation in interest rates on investment spending. The bond price data, based on
bias arising from contemporaneous correlation. Our results, however, are unchanged if we use a forward
mean-diﬀerenced transformation and/or allow for a lagged dependent variable.
20Given the theoretical and empirical attention lavished on investment-Q regressions, it is also of indepen-
dent interest to determine whether Q has explanatory power for investment once one controls for the user
cost, or, put diﬀerently, whether the user cost matters, conditional on Q. From a theoretical perspective,
asset markets, under constant returns to scale, should fully price the eﬀect of ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rates on
investment. Thus, the user cost should matter only to the extent that it serves as a tax-adjustment for Q.
The primary source of cross-sectional heterogeneity in our measure of the user cost comes from interest
rates, as variation in the tax term is not ﬁrm speciﬁc. Including both the user cost and Tobin’s Q, therefore,
provides further information on the extent to which Q serves as a suﬃcient statistic for investment.
31trades in the secondary market, allowed us to use a ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of the marginal
cost of external ﬁnance to construct the user cost of capital. In contrast to a large number
of previous studies that have documented little, if any, systematic relationship between
the cost of capital and investment spending, our results imply a robust and quantitatively
important eﬀect of the user cost on investment at the ﬁrm level. According to our benchmark
estimates, a 1 percentage point increase in the user cost of capital implies a reduction in
the rate of investment of 50 to 75 basis points and, in the long run, a 1 percent reduction
in the stock of capital.
Given the substantial variation in ﬁnancing costs observed both over time and across
ﬁrms, our results bring renewed interest to questions regarding the determination of capital
costs and their eﬀect on investment spending. In particular, our results suggest that, in
the absence of countervailing forces, the sharp widening in corporate yield spreads and the
associated rise in default risk experienced by the corporate sector during 2001–02 period
likely exerted a signiﬁcant drag on investment spending during the most recent economic
downturn.
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35Appendices
A Components of the User Cost of Capital
This appendix describe the construction of the industry-speciﬁc components of the user
cost of capital. Unless otherwise noted, the underlying industry-level data come from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and are available at the annual frequency from 1987 to
2005. Following the BEA, our industry classiﬁcation encompasses 52 industries based on the
3-digit (in some cases 4-digit) North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS).
Price of New Investment, Capital, and Output: The annual data on the price of
new investment and the price of existing capital stock come from the BEA’s Detailed Fixed
Assets Tables. Using the chain-type quantity indexes and the historical-cost investment in,
and holdings of, private ﬁxed assets—that is, equipment and software, and structures—we
derived an implicit price deﬂator for investment goods (P
I
st) and an implicit price deﬂator
for the existing capital stock (P
K
st) for all 52 industries. Chain-type price indexes for gross
output for the same set of industries (P
Y
st) come from the BEA’s Gross-Domestic-Product-
by-Industry Accounts. The base year for all indexes in 2000. Because ﬁrms in our sample
have ﬁscal years ending in diﬀerent months of the year, we interpolated the annual price
indexes to monthly frequency using cubic splines.21 The resulting industry-level monthly
price indexes were averaged over the 12 relevant months of each ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year and merged
with the annual ﬁrm-level data.





st]), we employed a simplifying assumption that any expected
capital gains in year t are equal to the ﬁve-year moving average of the realized capital
goods inﬂation—as measured by the industry-speciﬁc price deﬂator for new investment
goods P
I

























We experimented with a number of other adaptive schemes to create a proxy for expected
capital gains—including setting it equal to zero—and all of our results were robust to these
alternative assumptions.
Depreciation: To construct depreciation rates, we used annual estimates of net stocks
and depreciation by NAICS industry for private nonresidential ﬁxed assets available in






21See, for example, de Boor [1981]. We also took logs of all industry-level series prior to the interpolation;
the logs of price indexes at the monthly frequency were then exponentiated to obtain monthly levels of price
indexes at the industry level.
36where Dst is the real dollar value of depreciation of private ﬁxed assets in industry s during
year t and Ks,t−1 is the real stock of capital in industry s at the end of year t − 1. As
with the price indexes, we interpolated the annual industry-speciﬁc depreciation rates to
monthly frequency using cubic splines, and the resulting monthly data were then averaged
over the 12 relevant months of each ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year and merged with the annual ﬁrm-level
data.22
Tax Considerations: Our source of the tax-related data is the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US
quarterly macroeconometric model of the U.S. economy. The FRB/US model separates
business ﬁxed investment into three categories of investment spending: high-tech equip-
ment, other business equipment, and business structures. For each of these investment cat-
egories, the FRB/US model contains a detailed modeling of the tax code for depreciation
allowances, tax service lives, and investment tax credits. Our sample period (1987–2005),
however, is marked by a relatively stable corporate tax environment. For example, the
marginal tax rate on corporate proﬁts (τt), which we assume to be common across ﬁrms,
was 34 percent between 1987:Q1 and 1992:Q4 and 35 percent for the remainder of our sam-
ple period. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the investment tax credit on most assets
(the ITC term in the user cost formula) and, with the exception of the Job Creation and
Worker Assistance Act of 2002, the patterns of depreciation used to calculate the present
discounted (PDV) value of depreciation deductions are relatively straightforward.
To construct the PDV of depreciation allowances (zt) at the industry level, we combined
the BEA’s investment data with the FRB/US tax-related series. Speciﬁcally, the FRB/US
model contains expressions for the PDV of depreciation allowances for high-tech equipment
(z
HT
t ), other business equipment (z
OTH
t ), and nonresidential structures (z
NR S
t ), based on con-
tinuous time formulas for allowable depreciation methods. Speciﬁcally, letting L denote a
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l∗
e−itdt,
where B is the declining balance used in the accelerated depreciation method (e.g., in
case of a double declining balance pattern B = 2), i is the nominal interest rate, and
0 < l∗ < L is the optimal switchover time from the accelerated depreciation to the straight-
line method.23 We set the nominal interest rate i equal to 7 percent when calculating the
PDV of depreciation allowances. The expressions in the FRB/US also take into account
temporary increases in depreciation allowances for spending on equipment and software
(E&S) that were passed in 2002 and 2003.24
22Prior to the interpolation, we applied the logit transformation to annual depreciation rates, and the
resulting interpolated series were then transformed back using the inverse logit transformation. This trans-
formation of the data ensured that the interpolated monthly depreciation rates remained in the (0,1) interval.
23Under accelerated depreciation, ﬁrms can never deduct the full nominal value of their purchase, so the
tax code allows a switch to the straight-line method to complete the depreciation write-oﬀ. For high-tech and
other business equipment categories of investment spending, these formulas take into account the optimal
switchover point from accelerated depreciation methods to the straight line pattern of depreciation—for
nonresidential structures, by contrast, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 stipulates only the straight-line method.
24The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 included a temporary increase in depreciation




t , and z
NR S
t from quarterly to
monthly frequency using cubic splines.25 From the BEA’s Detailed Fixed Assets Tables, we





t , and I
NR S
t , respectively—and interpolated them to monthly
frequency using the same methodology as in the case of price indexes. We then constructed
































t denotes aggregate (nominal) investment in E&S, interpolated to
monthly frequency using the same method. Using (nominal) investment in E&S and non-




st , respectively—we introduced
























st denotes business ﬁxed investment in industry s, and where once
again all the industry-speciﬁc investment series were interpolated from annual to monthly
frequency using cubic splines. The resulting monthly PDV of depreciation allowances at
the industry level were then averaged over the 12 relevant months of each ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year
and merged with the annual ﬁrm-level data.
allowances for business spending on E&S in the form of 30 percent partial expensing; in 2003, this bonus
depreciation was raised to 50 percent.
25As in the case of depreciation rates, we used the logit and inverse logit transformations to ensure that
the interpolated series remained in the (0,1) range.
38B Income and Balance Sheet Data
This appendix describes the construction of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables used in our analysis.
In variable deﬁnitions, xn denotes the Compustat data item n.
• Investment: Nominal gross investment in year t (x30) was deﬂated by the industry-
speciﬁc price deﬂator for new investment P
I
st.
• Capital Stock: The book value of net property, plant, and equipment at the end of
year t (x8) was deﬂated by the industry-speciﬁc price deﬂator for capital stock P
K
st.
• Sales: Net sales in year t (x12) were deﬂated by the industry-speciﬁc price deﬂator
for gross output P
Y
st.
• Operating Income: Operating income (or loss) in year t (x13) was deﬂated by the
industry-speciﬁc price deﬂator for gross output P
Y
st.
• Tobin’s Q: The average Q was deﬁned as the ratio of the sum of the market value of
common shares outstanding and the book value of total liabilities at the end of year
t (x25 × x199) to the book value of total assets at the end of year t (x6).
The real investment rate [I/K]jt was then deﬁned as the ratio of real investment expendi-
tures in year t relative to the real capital stock at the end of year t − 1; sales to capital
[S/K]jt and operating income to capital [Π/K]jt ratios were similarly scaled by the real
capital stock at the end of year t − 1. To ensure that our results were not inﬂuenced by
a small number of extreme observations, we dropped from our panel all observations that
failed to satisfy any of the following four criteria:
1. 0.01 ≤ [I/K]jt ≤ 1.00;
2. 0.00 < [S/K]jt ≤ 25.0;
3. −0.50 ≤ [Π/K]jt ≤ 3.00;
4. 0.00 < Q
A VG
jt ≤ 40.0.
To construct the industry-speciﬁc scaling constants φs and ψs used to calculate our
estimates of the marginal product of capital, we constructed a panel of all nonfarm, non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Compustat during the 1987–2005 period and from which we eliminated
all extreme observations using the same four selection criteria as above. Recall that the
scaling constants φs and ψs are intended to account for the fact that the sales-to-capital and
operating-income-to-capital ratios vary substantially across industries, whereas in equilib-





























































39where M is the number of ﬁrms in our panel, Ns is the number of nonfarm, nonﬁnancial
Compustat ﬁrms in industry s, and T =
 
j Tj denotes the time-series dimension of each
panel.
The ﬁrst term in both expressions is simply the sample average—across ﬁrms and years—
of the user cost of capital, calculated using our panel of 898 ﬁrms over the 1987–2005
period. The second terms correspond to the sample averages of the sales-to-capital and
operating-income-to-capital ratios for industry s, respectively, calculated using the panel of
all nonfarm, nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in Compustat over the same period. Thus, the industry-
speciﬁc scaling factors φs and ψs are deﬁned so that the sales-to-capital and operating-
income-to-capital ratios of diﬀerent industries are, on average, equal to the average rate
of return on capital—as measured by our estimate of the user cost—over the 1987–2005
period.
40